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Abstract. The existential theory of the reals (ETR) consists of existentially quantified boolean
formulas over equalities and inequalities of real-valued polynomials. We propose the approxi-
mate existential theory of the reals (ǫ-ETR), in which the constraints only need to be satisfied
approximately. We first show that unconstrained ǫ-ETR = ETR, and then study the ǫ-ETR
problem when the solution is constrained to lie in a given convex set. Our main theorem is a
sampling theorem, similar to those that have been proved for approximate equilibria in normal
form games. It states that if an ETR problem has an exact solution, then it has a k-uniform
approximate solution, where k depends on various properties of the formula. A consequence of
our theorem is that we obtain a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for a
fragment of constrained ǫ-ETR. We use our theorem to create several new PTAS and QPTAS
algorithms for problems from a variety of fields.
1 Introduction
Sampling techniques. The Lipton-Markakis-Mehta algorithm (LMM) is a well known method
for computing approximate Nash equilibria in normal form games [28]. The key idea behind their
technique is to prove that there exist approximate Nash equilibria where both players use simple
strategies.
Suppose that we have a convex set C = conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) defined by vectors c1 through cl. A
vector x ∈ C is k-uniform if it can be written as a sum of the form (β1/k)·c1+(β2/k)·c2+· · ·+(βl/k)·cl,
where each βi is a non-negative integer and
∑l
i=1 βi = k.
Since there are at most lO(k) k-uniform vectors, one can enumerate all k-uniform vectors in lO(k)
time. For approximate equilibria in n × n bimatrix games, Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta showed
that for every ǫ > 0 there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium where both players use k-uniform strategies
where k ∈ O(log n/ǫ2), and so they obtained a quasi-polynomial approximation scheme (QPTAS)
for finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Their proof of this fact uses a sampling argument. Every bimatrix game has an exact Nash
equilibrium (NE), and each player’s strategy in this NE is a probability distribution. If we sample
from each of these distributions k times, and then construct new k-uniform strategies using these
samples, then when k ∈ O(log n/ǫ2) there is a positive probability the new strategies form an ǫ-NE.
So by the probabilistic method, there must exist a k-uniform ǫ-NE.
The sampling technique has been widely applied. It was initially used by Altho¨fer [1] in zero-
sum games, before being applied to non-zero sum games by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta [28].
Subsequently, it was used to produce algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in normal form
games with many players [3], sparse bimatrix games [4], tree polymatrix [5], and Lipschitz games [20].
It has also been used to find constrained approximate equilibria in polymatrix games with bounded
treewidth [18].
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† The work of this author was supported by the EPSRC grant EP/P020909/1.
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At their core, each of these results uses the sampling technique in the same way as the LMM
algorithm: first take an exact solution to the problem, then sample from this solution k times, and
finally prove that with positive probability the sampled vector is an approximate solution to the
problem. The details of the proofs, and the value of k, are often tailored to the specific application,
but the underlying technique is the same.
The existential theory of the reals. In this paper we ask the following question: is there a broader
class of problems to which the sampling technique can be applied? We answer this by providing a
sampling theorem for the existential theory of the reals. The existential theory of the reals consists of
existentially quantified formulae using the connectives {∧,∨,¬} over polynomials compared with the
operators {=,≤, <,≥, >}. For example, each of the following is a formula in the existential theory
of the reals.
∃x∃y∃z · (x = y) ∧ (x > z) ∃x · (x2 = 2)
∃x∃y · ¬(x10 = y100) ∨ (y ≥ 4) ∃x∃y∃z · (x2 + y2 = z2)
Given a formula in the existential theory of the reals, we must decide whether the formula is true,
that is, whether there do indeed exist values for the variables that satisfy the formula.
The complexity class ETR is defined to be all problems that can be reduced in polynomial time
to the existential theory of the reals. It is known that ETR ⊆ PSPACE [12], and NP ⊆ ETR since the
problem can easily encode Boolean satisfiability. However, the class is not known to be equal to either
PSPACE or NP, and it seems to be a distinct class of problems between the two. Many problems
are now known to be ETR-complete, including various problems involving constrained equilibria in
normal form games with at least three players [6,7,8,9,22].
Our contribution. In this paper we propose the approximate existential theory of the reals (ǫ-
ETR), where we seek a solution that approximately satisfies the constraints of the formula. We show
a subsampling theorem for a large fragment of ǫ-ETR, which can be used to obtain PTASs and
QPTASs for the problems that lie within it. We believe that this will be useful for future research:
instead of laboriously reproving subsampling results for specific games, it now suffices to simply write
a formula in ǫ-ETR and then apply our theorem to immediately get the desired result. To exemplify
this, we prove several new QPTAS and PTAS results using our theorem.
Our first result is actually that ǫ-ETR = ETR, meaning that the problem of finding an approxi-
mate solution to an ETR formula is as hard as finding an exact solution. However, this result crucially
relies on the fact that ETR formulas can have solutions that are doubly-exponentially large. This
motivates the study of constrained ǫ-ETR, where the solutions are required to lie within a given
convex set.
Our main theorem (Theorem 2) gives a subsampling result for constrained ǫ-ETR. It states that
if the formula has an exact solution, then it also has a k-uniform approximate solution, where the
value of k depends on various parameters of the formula, such as the number of constraints and
the number of variables. The theorem allows for the formula to be written using tensor constraints,
which are a type of constraint that is useful in formulating game-theoretic problems.
The consequence of the main theorem is that, when various parameters of the formula are constant
(see Corollary 1), we are able to obtain a QPTAS for approximating the existential theory of the
reals. Specifically, this algorithm either finds an approximate solution of the constraints, or verifies
that no exact solution exists. In many game theoretic applications an exact solution always exists,
and so this algorithm will always find an approximate solution.
It should be noted that we are not just applying the well-known subsampling techniques in
order to derive our main theorem. Our main theorem incorporates a new method for dealing with
polynomials of degree d, which prior subsampling techniques were not able to deal with.
Our theorem can be applied to a wide variety of problems. In the game theoretic setting, we prove
new results for constrained approximate equilibria in normal form games, and approximating the
value vector of a Shapley game. We also show optimization results. Specifically, we give approximation
algorithms for optimizing polynomial functions over a convex set, subject to polynomial constraints.
We also give algorithms for approximating eigenvalues and eigenvectors of tensors. Finally, we apply
the theorem to some problems from computational geometry.
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2 The Existential Theory of the Reals
Let x1, x2, . . . , xq ∈ R be distinct variables, which we will treat as a vector x ∈ Rq. A term of a
multivariate polynomial is a function T (x) := a·xd11 ·xd22 ·· · ··xdqq , where d1, d2, . . . , dq are non negative
integers and a ∈ R. A multivariate polynomial is a function p(x) := T1(x) + T2(x) + · · ·+ Tt(x) + c,
where each Ti is a term as defined above, and c ∈ R is a constant.
We now define Boolean formulae over multivariate polynomials. The atoms of the formula are
polynomials compared with {<,≤,=,≥, >}, and the formula itself can use the connectives {∧,∨,¬}.
Definition 1. The existential theory of the reals consists of every true sentence of the form ∃x1∃x2 . . .∃xq ·
F (x), where F is a Boolean formula over multivariate polynomials of x1 through xq.
Given a Boolean formula F , the ETR problem is to decide whether F is a true sentence in the
existential theory of the reals. We will say that F has m constraints if it uses m operators from the
set {<,≤,=,≥, >} in its definition.
The approximate ETR. In the approximate existential theory of the reals, we replace the operators
{<,≤,≥, >} with their approximate counterparts. We define the operators <ǫ and >ǫ with the
interpretation that x <ǫ y holds if and only if x < y + ǫ and x >ǫ y if and only if x > y − ǫ. The
operators ≤ǫ and ≥ǫ are defined analogously.
We do not allow equality tests in the approximate ETR. Instead, we require that every constraint
of the form x = y should be translated to (x ≤ y)∧(y ≤ x) before being weakened to (x ≤ǫ y)∧(y ≤ǫ
x).
We also do not allow negation in Boolean formulas. Instead, we require that all negations are
first pushed to atoms, using De Morgan’s laws, and then further pushed into the atoms by changing
the inequalities. So the formula ¬((x ≤ y) ∧ (a ≥ b)) would first be translated to (x ≥ y) ∨ (a ≤ b)
before then being weakened to (x ≥ǫ y) ∨ (a ≤ǫ y).
Definition 2. The approximate existential theory of the reals consists of every true sentence of the
form ∃x1∃x2 . . . ∃xq · F (x), where F is a negation-free Boolean formula using the operators {<ǫ,≤ǫ
,≥ǫ, >ǫ} over multivariate polynomials of x1 through xq.
Given a Boolean formula F , the ǫ-ETR problem asks us to decide whether F is a true sentence
in the approximate existential theory of the reals, where the operators {<ǫ,≤ǫ,≥ǫ, >ǫ} are used.
Unconstrained ǫ-ETR. Our first result is that if no constraints are placed on the value of the
variables, that is if each xi can be arbitrarily large, then ǫ-ETR = ETR for all values of ǫ ∈ R. We
show this via a two way reduction between ǫ-ETR and ETR. The reduction from ǫ-ETR to ETR
is trivial, since we can just rewrite each constraint x <ǫ y as x < y + ǫ, and likewise for the other
operators.
For the other direction, we show that the ETR-complete problem Feas, which asks us to decide
whether a system of multivariate polynomials (pi)i=1,...,k has a shared root, can be formulated in
ǫ-ETR. Here we rely on a result of Schaefer and Stefankovic [30], which showed that Feas has a
solution if and only if there is a point x such that |pi(x)| < 2−2L+5 for all i, where L is the number of
bits used to represent the polynomials. To formulate the problem in ǫ-ETR, we blow-up the instance
by multiplying each polynomial by a doubly-exponentially large number t that is bigger than ǫ ·22L+5.
The number t can be constructed by a polynomially-sized formula that uses repeated squaring. So
if we write down the constraint t · pi(x) ≤ǫ 0 in ǫ-ETR, then this implies that t · pi(x) ≤ ǫ and
therefore pi(x) < 2
−2L+5. Thus, via the lemma of Schaefer and Stefankovic, we can formulate Feas
in the ǫ-ETR. The full details of this reduction are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. ǫ-ETR = ETR for all ǫ ∈ R.
Constrained ǫ-ETR. In our negative result for unconstrained ǫ-ETR, we abused the fact that
variables could be arbitrarily large to construct the doubly-exponentially large number t. So, it
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makes sense to ask whether ǫ-ETR gets easier if we constrain the problem so that variables cannot
be arbitrarily large.
In this paper, we consider ǫ-ETR problems that are constrained by a convex set in Rq. For vectors
c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq we use conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) to denote the set containing every vector that lies in the
convex hull of c1 through cl. In the constrained ǫ-ETR, we require that the solution of the ǫ-ETR
problem should also lie in the convex hull of c1 through cl.
Definition 3. Given a Boolean formula F and vectors c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq, the constrained ǫ-ETR
problem asks us to decide whether
∃x1∃x2 . . .∃xq ·
(
x ∈ conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) ∧ F (x)
)
.
Note that, unlike the constraints used in F , the convex hull constraints are not weakened. So the
resulting solution x1, x2, . . . , xq , must actually lie in the convex set.
3 Approximating Constrained ǫ-ETR
Polynomial classes. To state our main theorem, we will use a certain class of polynomials where
the coefficients are given as a tensor. This will be particularly useful when we apply our theorem to
certain problems, such as normal form games. To be clear though, this is not a further restriction on
the constrained ǫ-ETR problem, since all polynomials can be written down in this form.
The variables of the polynomials we will study will be p-dimensional vectors denoted as x1, x2, . . . , xn,
where xj(i) will denote the i-th element of vector xj . The coefficients of the polynomials will be a
tensor denoted by A. Given a ×nj=1p tensor A, we denote by a(i1, . . . , in) its element with coordi-
nates (i1, . . . , in) on the tensor’s dimensions 1, . . . , n, respectively, and by α we denote the maximum
absolute value of these elements. We define the following two classes of polynomials.
– Simple tensor multivariate.
We will use STM(A, xd11 , . . . , x
dn
n ) denote an STM polynomial with n variables where each variable
xj , j ∈ [n] is applied dj times on tensor A that defines the coefficients. Tensor A has
∑n
j=1 dj
dimensions with p indices each. We will say that an STM polynomial is of maximum degree d, if
d = maxj dj . Here is an example of a degree 2 simple tensor polynomial with two variables:
STM(A, x2, y) =
p∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
p∑
k=1
x(i) · x(j) · y(k) · a(i, j, k) + 10.
This polynomial itself is written as follows.
STM(A, xd11 , . . . , x
dn
n ) =∑
i1,1∈[p]
· · ·
∑
in,dn∈[p]
(x1(i1,1)) · . . . · (x1(i1,d1)) · . . . · (xn(in,1)) · . . . · (xn(in,dn))·
· a(i1,1, . . . , i1,d1 . . . , in,1, . . . , in,dn) + a0.
– Tensor multivariate. A tensor multivariate (TMV) polynomial is the sum over a number of
simple tensor multivariate polynomials. We will use TMV(x1, . . . , xn) to denote a tensor
multivariate polynomial with n vector variables, which is formally defined as
TMV(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i∈[t]
STM(Ai, x
di1
1 , . . . , x
din
n ),
where the exponents di1, . . . , din depend on i, and t is the number of simple multivariate poly-
nomials. We will say that TMV(x1, . . . , xn) has length t if it is the sum of t STM polynomials,
and that it is of degree d if d = max
i∈[t],j∈[n]
dij .
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ǫ-ETR with tensor constraints. We focus on ǫ-ETR instances F where all constraints are of the
form TMV(x1, . . . , xn) ⊲⊳ 0, where ⊲⊳ is an operator from the set {<ǫ,≤ǫ, >ǫ,≥ǫ}. Recall that each
TMV constraint considers vector variables. We consider the number of variables used in F (denoted
as n) to be the number of vector variables used in the TMV constraints. So the value of n used in our
main theorem may be constant if only a constant number of vectors are used, even if the underlying
ǫ-ETR instance actually has a non-constant number of variables. For example, if x and y and w
are p-dimensional probability distributions and A1 and A2 are p × p tensors, the TMV constraint
xTA1y + w
TA2x > 0 has three variables, degree 1, length two; though the underlying problem has
3 · p variables.
Note that every ǫ-ETR constraint can be written as a TMV constraint, because all multivariate
polynomials can be written down as a TMV polynomial. Every term of a TMV can be written as a
STM polynomial where the tensor entry is non zero for exactly the combination of variables used in
the term, and 0 otherwise. Then a TMV polynomial can be constructed by summing over the STM
polynomial for each individual term.
The main theorem. Given an ǫ-ETR formula F , we define exact(F ) to be a Boolean formula in
which every approximate constraint is replaced with its exact variant, meaning that every instance
of x ≤ǫ y is replaced with x ≤ y, and likewise for the other operators.
Our main theorem is as follows.
Theorem 2. Let F be an ǫ-ETR instance with n vector variables and m multivariate-polynomial
constraints each one of maximum length t and maximum degree d, constrained by a convex set defined
by c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rnp . Let α be the maximum absolute value of the coefficients of constraints of F ,
and let γ = maxi ‖ci‖∞. If exact(F ) has a solution in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl), then F has a k-uniform
solution in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) where
k =
48 · α6 · γ2d+2 · d5 · t4 · n6 · ln(2 · α · γ · d · t · n ·m)
ǫ4
.
Consequences of the main theorem. Our main theorem gives a QPTAS for approximating a
fragment of ǫ-ETR. The total number of k-uniform vectors in a convex set C = conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl)
is lO(k). So, if the parameters α, γ, d, t, and n are all constant, then our main theorem tells us that
the total number of k-uniform vectors is lO(logm), where m is the number of constraints. So if we
enumerate each k-uniform vector x, we can check whether F holds, and if it does, we can output x.
If no k-uniform vector exists that satisfies F , then we can determine that exact(F ) has no solution.
This gives us the following result.
Corollary 1. Let F be an ǫ-ETR instance constrained by the convex set defined by c1, c2, . . . , cl. If
α, γ, d, t, and n are constant, and l is polynomial, then we have an algorithm that runs in time
lO(logm) that either finds a solution to F , or determines that exact(F ) has no solution.
If m is constant and l is polynomial then this gives a PTAS, while if m and l are polynomial, then
this gives a QPTAS.
In Section 5 we will show that the problem of approximating the best social welfare achievable
by an approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player normal form game can be written down as a
constrained ǫ-ETR formula where α, γ, d, and m are constant. It has been shown that, assuming the
exponential time hypothesis, this problem cannot be solved faster than quasi-polynomial time [11,19],
so this also implies that constrained ǫ-ETR where α, γ, d, and m are constant cannot be solved faster
than quasi-polynomial time unless the exponential time hypothesis is false.
Many ǫ-ETR problems are naturally constrained by sets that are defined by the convex hull
of exponentially many vectors. The cube [0, 1]n is a natural example of one such set. Brute force
enumeration does not give an efficient algorithm for these problems, since we need to enumerate lO(k)
vectors, and l is already exponential. However, our main theorem is able to provide non-deterministic
polynomial time algorithms for these problems.
This is because each k-uniform vector is, by definition, the convex combination of at most k of the
vectors in the convex set, and this holds even if l is exponential. So, provided that k is polynomial,
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we can guess the subset of vectors that are used, and then verify that the formula holds. This is
particularly useful for problems where exact(F ) always has a solution, which is often the case in
game theory applications, since it places the approximation problem in NP, whereas computing the
exact solution may be ETR-complete.
Corollary 2. Let F be an ǫ-ETR instance constrained by the convex set defined by c1, c2, . . . , cl.
If α, γ, d, t, n, are polynomial, then there is a non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm that
either finds a solution to F , or determines that exact(F ) has no solution. Moreover, if exact(F ) is
guaranteed to have a solution, then the problem of finding an approximate solution for F is in NP.
A theorem for non-tensor formulas. One downside of Theorem 2 is that it requires that the
formula is written down using tensor constraints. We have argued that every ETR formula can be
written down in this way, but the translation introduces a new vector-variable for each variable in the
ETR formula. When we apply Theorem 2 to obtain PTASs or QPTASs we require that the number
of vector variables is at most polylogarithmic, and so this limits the application of the theorem to
ETR formulas that have at most polylogarithmically many variables.
The following theorem is a sampling result for ǫ-ETR with non-tensor constraints, which is proved
in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. Let F be an ǫ-ETR instance constrained over the convex set defined by c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈
R
q. Let m be the number of constraints used in F , Let γ = maxi ‖ci‖∞, let α be the largest constant
coefficient used in F , let t be the number of terms used in F , and let d be the maximum degree of the
polynomials in F . If exact(F ) has a solution in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl), then F has a k-uniform solution
in conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) where
k = α2 · γ2d−2 · (2d − 1)2 · t2 · log l/ǫ2.
The key feature here is that the number of variables does not appear in the formula for k, which
allows the theorem to be applied to some formulas for which Theorem 2 cannot. However, since the
theorem does not allow tensor constraints, its applicability is more limited because the number of
terms t will be much larger in non-tensor formulas. For example, as we will see in Section 5, we can
formulate bimatrix games using tensor constraints over constantly many vector variables, and this
gives a result using Theorem 2. No such result can be obtained via Theorem 3, because when we
formulate problem without tensor constraints, the number of terms t used in the inequalities becomes
polynomial.
4 The Proof of the Main Theorem
In this section we prove Theorem 2. Before we proceed with the technical results let us provide a
roadmap. We begin by considering two special cases, which when combined will be the backbone of
the proof of the main theorem.
Firstly, we will show how to deal with problems where every constraint of the Boolean formula
is a multilinear polynomial, which we will define formally later. We deal with this kind of problems
using Hoeffding’s inequality and the union bound, which is similar to how such constraints have been
handled in prior work.
Then, we study problems where the Boolean formula consists of a single degree d polynomial
constraint. We reduce this kind of problems to a constrained ǫ/2-ETR problem with multilinear
constraints, so we can use our previous result to handle the reduced problem. Degree d polynomials
have not been considered in previous work, and so this reduction is a novel extension of sampling
based techniques to a broader class of ǫ-ETR formulas.
Finally, we deal with the main theorem: we reduce the original ETR problem with multivariate
constraints to a set of ǫ′ − ETR problems with a single standard degree d constraint, and then we
use the last result to derive a bound on k.
Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals 7
Problems with multilinear constraints. We begin by considering constrained ǫ-ETR prob-
lems where the Boolean formula F consists of tensor-multilinear polynomial constraints. We will
use TML(A, x1, . . . , xn) to denote a tensor-multilinear polynomial with n variables and coefficients
defined by tensor A of size ×nj=1p. Formally,
TML(A, x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i1∈[p]
· · ·
∑
in∈[p]
x1(i1) · . . . · xn(in) · a(i1, . . . , in) + c.
We will use α to denote the maximum entry of tensor A in the absolute value sense and γ to denote
the infinite norm of the convex set that constrains the variables.
The following lemma is proved in Appendix C. The proof uses Hoeffding’s inequality and the
union bound, and is similar to previous applications of the sampling technique.
Lemma 1. Let F be a Boolean formula with n variables and m tensor-multilinear polynomial con-
straints and let Y be a convex set in the variables space. If the constrained ETR problem defined by
exact(F ) and Y has a solution, then the constrained ǫ-ETR problem defined by F and Y has a k
uniform solution where
k =
2 · α2 · γ2 · n2 · ln(2 · n ·m)
ǫ2
.
Problems with a standard degree d constraints. We now consider constrained ǫ-ETR problems
with exactly one tensor polynomial constraint of standard degree d. We will use TSD(A, x, d) to
denote a standard degree d tensor-polynomial with coefficients defined by the ×dj=1l tensor A. Here,
d identical vectors x are applied on A. Formally,
TSD(A, x, d) =
∑
i1∈[p]
· · ·
∑
id∈[p]
x(i1) · . . . · x(id) · a(i1, . . . , id) + c.
The following lemma is proved in Appendix D. To prove the lemma we consider the variable x
to be defined as the average of r = O(α
2·γd·d2
ǫ ) variables. This allows us to “break” the standard
degree d tensor polynomial to a sum of multilinear tensor polynomials and to a sum of not-too-many
multivariate polynomials. Then, the choice of r allows us to upper bound the error occurred by the
multivariate polynomials by ǫ2 . Then, we observe that in order to prove the lemma we can write
the sum of multilinear tensor polynomials as an ǫ2 -ETR problem with r variables and roughly r
d
multilinear constraints. This allows us to use Lemma 1 to complete the proof.
Lemma 2. Let F be a Boolean formula with variable x and one tensor-polynomial constraint of
standard degree d, and let Y be a convex set. If the constrained ETR problem defined by exact(F )
and Y has a solution, then the constrained ǫ-ETR problem defined by F and Y has a k-uniform
solution where
k =
24 · α6 · γ2d+2 · d5 · ln(2 · α · γ · d)
ǫ4
.
Problems with simple multivariate constraints. We now assume that we are given a constraint-
ǫ-ETR problem defined by a Boolean formula F of tensor simple multilinear polynomial constraints
and a convex set Y. As before γ = ‖Y‖∞ and let α be the maximum absolute value of the coefficients
of the constraints. We will say that the constraints are of maximum degree d if d is the maximum
degree among all variables. The following lemma is proved in Appendix E. The idea is to rewrite
the problem as an equivalent problem with standard degree d constraints and then apply Lemmas 2
and 1 to derive the bound for k.
Lemma 3. Let F be a Boolean formula with n variables andm simple tensor-multivariate polynomial
constraints of maximum degree d and let Y be a convex set in the variables space. If the constrained
ETR problem defined by exact(F ) and Y has a solution, then the constrained ǫ-ETR problem defined
by F and Y has a k uniform solution where
k =
48 · α6 · γ2d+2 · d5 · n6 · ln(2 · α · γ · d · n ·m)
ǫ4
.
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The proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Assume that x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n ∈ Y is a solution for exact(F ). Consider now a multivariate constraint
i ∈ [m] of F defined by TMVi(x1, . . . , xn). Firstly, we replace this constraint by
|TMVi(x1, . . . , xn)− TMVi(x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤ ǫ. (1)
Then, replace Constraint (1) by t constraints of the form
|STMi,j(x1, . . . , xn)− STMi,j(x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤
ǫ
t
(2)
where STMi,1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , STMi,t(x1, . . . , xn) are the simple tensor multivariate polynomials
TMVi(x1, . . . , xn) consists of. By the triangle inequality we get that if all t constraints given by (2)
hold, then Constraint (1) holds as well. Hence, we can reduce the problem to an equivalent problem
with the same n variables and m · t constraints that all of them are simple tensor multivariate
polynomials. So, we can apply Lemma 3 where we replace m with m · t and ǫ with ǫt . This completes
the proof of the theorem. ⊓⊔
5 Applications
We now show how our theorems can be applied to derive new approximation algorithms for a variety
of problems.
Constrained approximate Nash equilibria. A constrained Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium that satisfies some extra constraints, like specific bounds on the payoffs of the players. Con-
strained Nash equilibria attracted the attention of many authors, who proved NP-completeness for
two-player games [23,14,6] and ETR-completeness for three-player games [6,7,8,9,22] for constrained
exact Nash equilibria.
Constrained approximate equilibria have been studied, but so far only lower bounds have been
derived [2,25,11,19,18]. It has been observed that sampling methods can give QPTASs for finding
constrained approximate Nash equilibria for certain constraints in two player games [19].
By applying Theorem 2, we get the following result for games with a constant number of players:
Any property of an approximate equilibrium that can be formulated in ǫ-ETR where α, γ, d, t and
n are constant has a QPTAS. This generalises past results to a much broader class of constraints,
and provides results for games with more than two players, which had not previously been studied
in this setting. The details of this result are given in Appendix F.
Shapley games. Shapley’s stochastic games [31] describe a two-player infinite-duration zero-sum
game. The game consists of N states. Each state specifies a two-player M ×M matrix game where
the players compete over: (1) a reward (which may be negative) that is paid by player two to player
one, and (2) a probability distribution over the next state of the game. So each round consists of the
players playing a bimatrix game at some state s, which generates a reward, and the next state s′ of
the game. The reward in round i is discounted by λi−1, where 0 < λ < 1 is a discount factor. The
overall payoff to player 1 is the discounted sum of the infinite sequence of rewards generated during
the course of the game.
Shapley showed that these games are determined, meaning that there exists a value vector v,
where vs is the value of the game starting at state s. A polynomial-time algorithm has been devised
for computing the value vector of a Shapley game when the number of states N is constant [24].
However, since the values may be irrational, this algorithm needs to deal with algebraic numbers, and
the degree of the polynomial is O(N)N
2
, so if N is even mildly super-constant, then the algorithm is
not polynomial.
Shapley showed that the value vector is the unique solution of a system of polynomial optimality
equations, which can be formulated in ETR. Any approximate solution of these equations gives an
approximation of the value vector, and applying Theorem 2 gives us a QPTAS. This algorithm works
when N ∈ O( 6√logM), which is a value of N that prior work cannot handle. The downside of our
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algorithm is that, since we require the solution to be bounded by a convex set, the algorithm only
works when the value vector is reasonably small. Specifically, the algorithm takes a constant bound
B ∈ R, and either finds the approximate value of the game, or verifies that the value is strictly
greater than B. The details of the algorithm are given in Appendix G.
Optimization problems. Our framework can provide approximation schemes for optimization
problems with one vector variable x ∈ Rp with polynomial constraints over bounded convex sets.
Formally,
max h(x)
s.t. h1(x) > 0, . . . , hm(x) > 0
x ∈ conv(c1, . . . , cl)
where h(x), h1(x), . . . , hm(x) are polynomials with respect to vector x; for example h(x) = x
TAx,
where A is an p × p matrix, subject to h1(x) = xTx > 110 and x ∈ ∆p. We will call the polynomi-
als hi solution-constraints. Optimization problems of this kind received a lot of attention over the
years [15,16,17,21].
For optimization problems, we sample from the solution that achieves the maximum when we
apply Theorem 2, in order to prove that there is a k-uniform solution that is close to the maximum.
Our algorithm enumerates all k-uniform profiles, and outputs the one that maximizes the objective
function. Using this technique, Theorem 2 gives the following results.
1. There is a PTAS if h(x) is a STM polynomial of maximum degree independent of p, the number
of solution-constraints is independent of p, and l = poly(p).
2. There is QPTAS if h(x) is an STM polynomial of maximum degree up to poly log p, the number
of solution-constraints is poly(p), and l = poly(p).
To the best of our knowledge, the second result is new. The first result was already known, however
it was proven using completely different techniques: in [10] it was proven for the special case of degree
two, in [21] it was extended to any fixed degree, and alternative proofs of the fixed degree case were
also given in [16,17]. We highlight that in all of the aforementioned results solution constraints were
not allowed. Note that unless NP=ZPP there is no FPTAS for quadratic programming even when
the variables are constrained in the simplex [15]. Hence, our results can be seen as a partial answer
to the important question posed in [15]: “What is a complete classification of functions that allow a
PTAS?”
Tensor problems. Our framework provides quasi-polynomial time algorithms for deciding the
existence of approximate eigenvalues and approximate eigenvectors of tensors in Rp×p×p, where the
elements are bounded by a constant, where the solutions are required to be in a convex set. In [26]
it is proven that there is no PTAS for these problems when the domain is unrestricted. To the best
of our knowledge this is the first positive result for the problem even in this, restricted, setting. The
details of the algorithm are given in Appendix H.
Computational geometry. Finally, we note that our theorem can be applied to problems in
computational geometry, although the results are not as general as one may hope. Many problems in
this field are known to be ETR-complete, including, for example, the Steinitz problem for 4-polytopes,
inscribed polytopes and Delaunay triangulations, polyhedral complexes, segment intersection graphs,
disk intersection graphs, dot product graphs, linkages, unit distance graphs, point visibility graphs,
rectilinear crossing number, and simultaneous graph embeddings. We refer the reader to the survey
of Cardinal [13] for further details.
All of these problems can be formulated in ǫ-ETR, and indeed our theorem does give results for
these problems. However, our requirement that the bounding convex set be given explicitly limits
their applicability. Most computational geometry problems are naturally constrained by a cube,
so while Corollary 2 does give NP algorithms, we do not get QPTASs unless we further restrict the
convex set. In Appendix I we formulate QPTASs for the segment intersection graph and the unit disk
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intersection graph problems when the solutions are restricted to lie in a simplex. While it is not clear
that either problem has natural applications that are restricted in this way, we do think that future
work may be able to derive sampling theorems that are more tailored towards the computational
geometry setting.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we will show that unconstrained ǫ-ETR = ETR for all ǫ ∈ R. Every ǫ-ETR instance
can be trivially reduced in polynomial time to an ETR instance by replacing each constraint of
the form x =ǫ y with the constraint x = y + ǫ, and likewise translating <ǫ and ≤ǫ to their exact
counterparts.
It is less obvious that every ETR formula can be reformulated as an ǫ-ETR formula. We will
prove this by modifying a technique of Schaefer and Stefankovic [30]. They considered the following
problem, which asks us to find a shared root of a system of polynomials.
Definition 4 (Feas). Given a system of k multi-variate polynomials pi : R
n → Rn, decide whether
there exists an x ∈ Rn such that pi(x) = 0 for all i.
Schaefer and Stefankovic showed that this problem is ETR-complete.
Theorem 4 ([30]). Feas is ETR-complete.
We will reduce Feas to ǫ-ETR. Let P = (pi)i=1,...,k be an instance of Feas, and let L be the
number of bits needed to represent this instance. We define gap(P ) = 2−2
L+5
. The following lemma
was shown by Schaefer and Stefankovic.
Lemma 4 ([30]). Let P = (pi)i=1,...,k be an instance of Feas. If there does not exist an x ∈ Rn such
that pi(x) = 0 for all i, then for every x ∈ Rn there exists an i such that |pi(x)| > gap(P ).
In other words, if the instance of Feas is not solvable, then one of the polynomials will always be
bounded away from 0 by at least gap(P ).
The reduction. The first task is to build an ǫ-ETR formula that ensures that a variable t ∈ R
satisfies t ≥ ǫ/ gap(P ). This can be done by the standard trick of repeated squaring, but we must
ensure that the ǫ-inequalities do not interfere with the process. We define the following formula over
the variables t, g1, g2, . . . , gL+5 ∈ Rn, where all of the following constraints are required to hold.
g1 ≥ǫ 2 + ǫ,
gi ≥ǫ g2i−1 + ǫ for all i > 1.
t ≥ǫ ǫ · gL+5 + ǫ
In other words, this requires that g1 ≥ 2, and gi ≥ g2i−1. So we have gL+5 ≥ 22
L+5
, and hence
t ≥ ǫ/ gap(P ). Note that the size of this formula is polynomial in the size of P .
Given an instance P = (pi)i=1,...,k of Feas we create the following ǫ-ETR instance ψ, where all of
the following are required to hold.
t · pi(x) ≤ǫ 0 for all i, (3)
t · pi(x) ≥ǫ 0 for all i, (4)
t ≥ ǫ/ gap(P ), (5)
where the final inequality is implemented using the construction given above.
Lemma 5. ψ is satisfiable if and only if P has a solution.
Proof. First, let us assume that P has a solution. This means that there exists an x ∈ Rn such that
pi(x) = 0 for all i. Note that x clearly satisfies Inequalities 3 and 4, while Inequality 5 can be satisfied
by fixing t to be any number greater than ǫ/ gap(P ). So we have proved that ψ is satisfiable.
On the other hand, now we will assume that x ∈ Rn satisfies ψ. Note that we must have
pi(x) ≤ ǫ/t ≤ gap(P )
and likewise
pi(x) ≥ −ǫ/t ≥ − gap(P ),
and hence |pi(x)| ≤ gap(P ) for all i. But Lemma 4 states that this is only possible in the case where
P has a solution. ⊓⊔
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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B Proof of Theorem 3
We will use the following theorem of Barman.
Theorem 5 ([4]). Let c1, c2, . . . , cl ∈ Rq with maxi ‖ci‖∞ ≤ 1. For every x ∈ conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) and
every ǫ > 0 there exists a O(log l/ǫ2)-uniform vector x′ ∈ conv(c1, c2, . . . , cl) such that ‖x−x′‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
The following lemma shows that if we take two vectors x and x′ that are close in the L∞ norm,
then for all polynomials p the value of |p(x) − p(x′)| cannot be too large.
Lemma 6. Let p(x) be a multivariate polynomial over x ∈ Rq with degree d and let ǫ ∈ (0, γ] for
some constant γ > 0. For every pair of vectors x, x′ ∈ [0, γ]q with ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ ǫ we have:
|p(x)− p(x′)| ≤ γd−1 · (2d − 1) · consts(p) · terms(p) · ǫ.
Proof. Consider a term of p(x), which can without loss of generality be written as t(x) = c · ∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi
, where it could be the case that any number of xi’s are the same. We have
|t(x)− t(x′)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
c ·
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi − c ·
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
(xi + ǫ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi −


∏
i∈[q]∑
i
=d
xi +
(
d
1
)
γd−1ǫ +
(
d
2
)
γd−2ǫ2 + · · ·+
(
d
d
)
γ0ǫd


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c ·
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ ·
d∑
k=1
(
d
k
)
γd−1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c · ǫ · γd−1 ·
d∑
k=1
(
d
k
)
= ǫ · c · γd−1 · (2d − 1),
where the second to last four lines use the fact that xi’s, and ǫ are all less than or equal to γ.
Next consider a term t(x) of p(x) of degree d′ ≤ d. This can be written similarly to the afore-
mentioned term. Then |t(x) − t(x′)| ≤ c · ǫ · γd−1 · (2d′ − 1) ≤ c · ǫ · γd−1 · (2d − 1). Since there are
terms(p) many terms in p, we therefore have that
|p(x)− p(x′)| ≤ γd−1 · (2d − 1) · consts(p) · terms(p) · ǫ.
⊓⊔
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We now apply this to prove Theorem 3.
Proof (of Theorem 3). Let x be the solution to exact(F ). First we apply Theorem 5 to find a point
y that is k-uniform, where k = α2 · γ2d−2 · (2d − 1)2 · t2 · log l/ǫ2, such that
‖x− y‖∞ ≤ ǫ/(α · γd−1 · (2d − 1) · t).
Next we can apply Lemma 6 to argue that, for each polynomial p used in F , we have
|p(x)− p(y)| ≤ α · γd−1 · (2d − 1) · t ·
(
ǫ
α · γd−1 · (2d − 1) · t
)
= ǫ.
Since all constraints of F have a tolerance of ǫ, and since x satisfies exact(F ), we can conclude that
F (y) is satisfied. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ Y be a solution for exact(F ). Since we assume the Y is a convex set of
c1, . . . , cl any x ∈ Y can be written as a convex combination of the ci’s, i.e., x =
∑
i∈[l] ai · ci, where
ai ≥ 0 for every i ∈ [l], and
∑
i∈[l] ai = 1. Observe, a = (a1, . . . , al) corresponds to a probability
distribution over c1, . . . , cl, where vector ci is drawn with probability ai, and x can be thought of as
the mean of a. So, we can “sample” a point by sampling over cis according to the probability that
define this point.
For every i ∈ [n], let x′i be a k-uniform vector sampled independently from x∗i . To prove the
lemma, we will show that, because of the choice of k, with positive probability the sampled vectors
satisfy every constraint of the ǫ-ETR problem. Then, by the probabilistic method the lemma will
follow.
Let TMLj(Aj , x1, . . . , xn) be a multilinear polynomial that defines a constraint of F . For every
j ∈ [m] we define the following constraint
|TMLj(Aj , x′1, . . . , x′n)− TMLj(Aj , x∗1, . . . , x∗n)| ≤ ǫ. (6)
Observe that if x′1, . . . , x
′
n, satisfy inequality (6) for every j ∈ [m], then the lemma follows.
For every j ∈ [m], we replace the corresponding Constraint (6) with n linear constraints. For
notation simplicity, let us denote MLij the multivariate polynomial MLj(Aj , x1, . . . , xn) where we
set x1 = x
′
1, x2 = x
′
2, . . . , xi = x
′
i and xi+1 = x
∗
i+1, xi+2 = x
∗
i+2, . . . , xn = x
∗
n. Furthermore, let
ML0j =MLj(Aj , x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n). Then, for every i ∈ [n] we create the constraint
|MLij −MLi−1j | ≤
ǫ
n
. (7)
Observe that, if all n constraints defined in (7) are satisfied, then by the triangle inequality, the
corresponding Constraint (6) is satisfied as well.
Consider now MLij. This can be seen as a random variable that depends on the choice of x
′
i and
takes values in [−γ · α, γ ·α]. But recall that the x′i’s are sampled from x∗i using k samples, and that
they are mutually independent, so E
[
MLij
]
= MLi−1j . Thus, we can bound the probability that a
constraint (7) is not satisfied, i.e. bound the probability that |MLij −MLi−1j | > ǫn , using Hoeffding’s
inequality [27]. So,
Pr
(∣∣MLij −MLi−1j ∣∣ > ǫn
)
= Pr
(∣∣MLij − E[MLij]∣∣ > ǫn
)
≤ 2 · exp
(
− 2 · k
2 · ( ǫn)2
4 · k · γ2 · α2
)
= 2 · exp
(
− k · ǫ
2
2 · n2 · γ2 · α2
)
. (8)
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Recall, that we have n · m constraints of the form (7). We can bound the probability that any of
those constraints is violated, via the union bound. So, using (8) and the union bound, the probability
that any of these constraints is violated is upper bounded by
2 ·m · n · exp
(
− k · ǫ
2
2 · n2 · γ2 · α2
)
. (9)
Hence, if the value of (9) is strictly less than 1, then x′1, . . . , x
′
m satisfy all of the n·m linear constraints,
and thus the lemma follows. If we solve (9) for k, such that it is strictly less than 1, we get
k >
α2 · γ2 · n2 · ln(2 · n ·m)
ǫ2
which holds, by our choice of k.
⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 2
To prove the lemma we will first prove the following auxiliary Lemma.
Lemma 7. Let F be a Boolean formula with one variable and one tensor-polynomial constraint of
standard degree d, let Y be a convex set, and let r = 2·α2·γd·(d−1)2ǫ . If the constrained ETR problem
exact(F ) has a solution in Y, then there exists a satisfiable constrained ǫ2 −ETR problem ΠML with
r variables and
∏d−1
i=0 (r− i) tensor multilinear constraints, such that every solution of ΠML in Y can
be transformed to a solution for the constrained ǫ-ETR problem defined by F and Y.
Proof. Assume that x∗ ∈ Y is a solution for F . Let TSD(A, x, d) denote the tensor polynomial
of standard degree d used in F . For notation simplicity, let TSD(A, x, d) = A(xd). Create r new
variables x1, . . . , xr ∈ Y and set x = 1r (x1 + . . . + xr). Let X =
⋃r
i=1{xi} be a multiset of Y with
cardinality r, meaning that multiple copies of an element of Y are allowed in X . In the sequel we
will treat the elements of X as distinct, even though some might correspond to the same element
of Y. Then, note that A(xd) can be written as a sum of simple tensor-multivariate polynomials
where some of them are multilinear and have as variables x1, . . . , xr. Now, let S be the set of all
ordered d-tuples that can be made by drawing d elements from X with replacement. Formally,
S = {(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) : xˆ1, . . . , xˆd ∈ X}. Let us also define Sd to be the set of all ordered d-tuples that
can be made by drawing d elements from X without replacement. Formally, Sd = {(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) :
xˆ1, . . . , xˆd ∈ X , xˆ1, . . . , xˆd are pairwise different}, and observe that |Sd| =
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i). So, any
element of Sd, combined with tensor A, produces a multilinear polynomial. Hence, using the notation
introduced, we get that |A(xd)−A(x∗d)| is less than or equal to sum of
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ and (10)
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈S−Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ . (11)
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Observe, |S − Sd| = rd − |Sd| and that
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ γd · α for every A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd).
Then, for the sum given in (11) we get
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈S−Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣
≤
(
1− r · (r − 1) · · · (r − d+ 1)
rd
)
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− 1
r
)(
1− 2
r
)
·
(
1− d− 1
r
))
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− d− 1
r
)d−1)
· γd · α
≤
(
1−
(
1− (d− 1)
2
r
))
· γd · α
=
(d− 1)2
r
· γd · α
≤ ǫ
2
.
Hence, in order for the original constraint to be satisfied, it suffices to satisfy the constraint
1
rd
∑
(xˆ1,...,xˆd)∈Sd
∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
2
. (12)
Observe that |Sd| =
∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) < rd, therefore, instead of the constraint (12), it suffices to deal
with the following |Sd| constraints (we introduce one constraint for every (xˆ1, . . . , xˆd) ∈ Sd)∣∣∣A(xˆ1, . . . , xˆd)−A(x∗d)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
2
. (13)
The proof is completed by setting the set of tensor-multilinear constraints to be the union of
∏d−1
i=0 (r−
i) constraints defined by (13).
⊓⊔
We can combine Lemma 1 with Lemma 7 and prove Lemma 2.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). Firstly, use Lemma 7 to construct the constrained ǫ2 − ETR problem
ΠML with tensor-multilinear constraints. Recall that ΠML has r =
2·α2·γd·(d−1)2
ǫ variables and∏d−1
i=0 (r−i) < rd constraints. Then, from Lemma 1 we know that ifΠML is satisfiable, then there exist
k
r -uniform vectors x
′
1 ∈ Y, . . . , x′r ∈ Y that ǫ/2-satisfyΠML. Finally, observe that x′ = 1r ·(x′1+. . .+x′r)
is k-uniform. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let x∗1, . . . , x
∗
m be a solution for exact(F ). Let r =
2·α2·γd·(d−1)2·n
ǫ and let xˆ
i
1, . . . , xˆ
i
r be
k
r -
uniform vectors sampled from x∗i . Define x
′
i =
1
r (xˆ
i
1 + . . .+ xˆ
i
r).
Consider a constraint in j ∈ [m] defined by the simple tensor-multivariate polynomial
STMj(Aj , x
d1
1 , . . . , x
dm
m ). We will use the same technique we used in Lemma 1 to create n constraints,
where constraint i ∈ [n] is defined via a simple degree di polynomial. Again, for notation simplicity
for every i ∈ [m] we use STMij to denote the polynomial STMj(Aj , xd11 , . . . , xdmm ) where we set
x1 = x
′
1, . . . , xi = x
′
i and xi+1 = x
∗
i+1, . . . , xn = x
∗
n. Let STM
0
j := STMj(Aj , (x
∗
1)
d1 , . . . , (x∗n)
dn).
Then, we define the following n constraints
| STMij − STMi−1j | ≤
ǫ
2n
. (14)
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Observe that every constraint i of the form (14) defines simple degree di polynomial with respect to
variable x′i. Furthermore, observe that if every such constraint is satisfied, then the initial constraint
defined by STMj(Aj , x
d1
1 , . . . , x
dn
n ) is satisfied too. Then, we convert each such constraint to a set of∏d−1
i=0 (r − i) multilinear constraints with r variables, using Lemma 7 where we demand that every
multilinear constraint is ǫ2·n -satisfied. The proof is then completed by using Lemma 1 where we
observe that we have r ·n < 2·α2·γd·d2·n2ǫ variables and
∏d−1
i=0 (r− i) ·n ·m< rd ·n ·m constraints and
we set ǫ to ǫ2·n . ⊓⊔
F Constrained Approximate Nash equilibria application
A game is defined by the set of players, the set of actions for every player, and the payoff function of
every player. In normal form games, the payoff function is given by a multilinear function on a tensor
of appropriate size. Consider an n-player game where every player has l-actions, and let Aj denote
the payoff tensor of player j with elements in [0, 1]; Aj has size ×ni=1l. The interpretation of the tensor
Aj is the following: the element Aj(i1, . . . , in) of the tensor corresponds to the payoff of player j when
Player 1 chooses action i1, Player 1 chooses action i2, and so on. To play the game, every player j
chooses a probability distribution xj ∈ ∆l, a.k.a. a strategy, over their actions. A collection of strate-
gies is called strategy profile. The expected payoff of player j under the strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn) is
given by ML(Aj , x1, . . . , xn). For notation simplicity, let uj(xj , x−j) := ML(Aj , x1, . . . , xn), where
x−j is the strategy profile of all players except player j. A strategy profile (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a Nash equi-
librium if for every player j it holds that uj(x
∗
j , x
∗
−j) ≥ uj(xj , x∗−j) for every xj ∈ ∆l, or equivalently
uj(x
∗
j , x
∗
−j) ≥ uj(sp, x∗−j) for every possible sp, where sp denotes the case where player j chooses
their action p with probability 1.
Our framework formally captures the set of constrains that we can get a QPTAS for computing
approximate Nash equilibria in games with constant number of players.
Theorem 6. Let Γ be an n-player l-action normal form game Γ where n is constant. Furthermore,
let F be a Boolean formula with c = poly(l) TSM constraints of constant degree and of constant
length with variables the strategies of the players. Then in a quasi-polynomial time we can compute
a approximate NE of Γ constrained by F , or decide that no such constrained approximate NE exists.
Proof. Observe that we can write the problem of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium as
an ETR problem. The constraints of the problem will be the constraints of F plus the constraint
uj(sl, x−j)− uj(xj , x−j) ≤ 0
for every player i ∈ [m] and every action sl of player j.
Thus, we can use Theorem 2 and complete the proof since we produced an ǫ-ETR problem with
m = c + n · l = poly(l) constraints, which is polynomial in the input size; d and t are constants by
assumption; γ = 1 since every variable is a probability distribution; α = 1 by the definition of normal
form games. ⊓⊔
G Shapley’s stochastic games application
To formally define a Shapley game, we use N to denote the number of states, and M to denote the
number of actions. The game is defined by the following two functions.
– For each s ≤ N and j, k ≤M the function r(s, j, k) gives the reward at state s when player one
chooses action j and player two chooses action k.
– For each s, s′ ≤ N and j, k ≤ M the function p(s, s′, j, k) gives the probability of moving from
state s to state s′ when player one chooses action j and player two chooses action k. It is required
that
∑N
s′=1 p(s, s
′, j, k) = 1 for all s, j, and k.
The game begins at a given starting state. In each round of the game the players are at a state s,
and play the matrix game at that state by picking an action from the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}. The players
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are allowed to use randomization to make this choice. Supposing that the first player chose action j
and the second player chose the action k, the first player receives the reward r(s, j, k), and then a
new state s′ is chosen according to the probability distribution given by p(s, ·, j, k).
The reward in future rounds is discounted by a factor of λ where 0 < λ < 1 in each round. So
if r1, r2, . . . is the infinite sequence of rewards, the total reward paid by player two to player one is∑∞
i=1 λ
i−1 · ri, which, due to the choice of λ, is always a finite value.
The two players play the game by specifying a probability distribution at each state, which
represents their strategy for playing at that state. Let ∆M denote the M -dimensional simplex, which
represents the strategy space for both players at a single state. For each x, y ∈ ∆M , we overload
notation by defining the expected reward and next state functions.
r(s, x, y) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
x(j) · y(k) · r(s, i, j),
p(s, s′, x, y) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
x(j) · y(k) · p(s, s′, i, j).
Shapley showed that these games are determined [31], meaning that there is a unique vector
v ∈ RN such that vs is the value of the game starting at state s: player one has a strategy to ensure
that the expected reward is at least v(s), while player two has a strategy to ensure that the expected
reward is at most v(s). Furthermore, Shapley showed that this value vector is the unique solution of
the following optimality equations [31]. For each state s we have the equation
v(s) = min
x∈∆M
max
y∈∆M
(
r(s, x, y) + λ ·
N∑
s′=1
p(s, s′, x, y) · vs′
)
. (15)
In other words, vs must be the value of the one-shot zero-sum game at s, where the payoffs of this
zero-sum game are determined by the values of the other states given by vs′ .
Theorem 7. Let Γ be a Shapley game with N ∈ O( 6√logm), unbounded number of actions per
state, and rewards in [−c, c] for every state-action combination, where c is a constant. Furthermore,
let s be the starting state of the game. Let B ∈ R be a constant. In a quasi-polynomial time we can
approximately compute the value of Γ starting from s, if the value of every state less than or equal
to B, or decide that at least one of these values is greater than or equal to B.
Proof. Let v = (v(1), v(2), . . . , v(N)), and for every state s let xs and ys denote the strategy player
one and player two choose at state s respectively. Observe that r(s, xs, ys) is an STM polynomial
with variables x and y of the form
STM(As1, xs, ys) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
xs(j) · ys(k) · as1(j, k)
where as1(i, j, k) = r(s, j, k).
Observe furthermore that λ ·∑Ns′=1 p(s, s′, xs, ys) · vs′ can be written as an STM polynomial with
variables x, y and v of the form
STM(As2, x, y, v) =
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
xs(j) · ys(k) · v(l) · as2(j, k, l)
where as2(i, j, k) = λ · p(s, l, j, k).
Let us define TMVs(xs, ys, v) = STM(As1, xs, ys) + STM(As2, xs, ys, v); TMVs(xs, ys, v) has
length 2 and degree 1.
Observe, we can replace Equation (15) with the following 2 ·M TMV polynomial constraints
TMV(xs, ys, v)− TMV(j, ys, v) ≤ 0 for every action j ≤M of player one
TMV(xs, k, v)− TMV(xs, ys, v) ≥ 0 for every action k ≤M of player two.
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So, to approximate v(s) it suffices to solve the ǫ-ETR problem defined by the 2 ·M ·N constraints
defined as above for every state s ≤ N . Observe, the ǫ-ETR problem has: 2N + 1 variables (x1
through xN , y1 through yN , and v); 2 · M · N TMV constraints; γ = max
{
1,maxs v(s)
}
; α =
max
{
c, λ · maxs,s′,j,k p(s, s′, j, k)
}
= max{c, 1}, since λ < 1 and maxs,s′,j,k p(s, s′, j, k) < 1. So, if
N ∈ 6√logm, maxs v(s) is constant, and c is a constant, we can use Theorem 2 and derive a QPTAS
for (15).
Finally, we note that an approximate solution to (15) gives an approximation of the value vector
itself. This is because Shapley has shown that, when v is treated as a variable, the optimality equation
given in (15) is a contraction map. The value vector is a fixed point of this contraction map, and the
uniqueness of the value vector is guaranteed by Banach’s fixed point theorem. Our algorithm produces
an approximate fixed point of the optimality equations. It is easy to show, using the contraction map
property, that an approximate fixed point must be close to an exact fixed point. ⊓⊔
H Tensor Problems
Definition 5. The nonzero vector x ∈ Rp is an eigenvector of tensor A ∈ Rp×p×p if there exists an
eigenvalue λ ∈ R such that for every k ∈ [p] it holds that
n∑
i
n∑
j
a(i, j, k) · x(i) · x(j) = λ · x(k). (16)
Theorem 8. Let A be an Rp×p×p tensor with entries in [−c, c], where c is a constant. Furthermore,
let B ∈ R be a constant and let Y be a convex set where ‖Y‖∞ is a constant. In a quasi-polynomial
time we can compute an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair (λ, x) that approximately satisfy (16) such that
λ ≤ B and x ∈ Y, or decide that no such pair exists.
Proof. Observe that
∑n
i
∑n
j a(i, j, k) ·x(i) ·x(j) can be written as an STM polynomial STM(A1, x2)
where a1(i, j) = a(i, j, k). Furthermore, let ℓ be a p-dimensional vector. Then, λ ·x(k) can be written
as an STM polynomial STM(A2, x, ℓ), where a2(k, 1) = 1 and zero otherwise.
So, Equation 16 can be written as an TMV polynomial constraint of degree 2 and length 2,
with two vector variables, x and ℓ. So, the problem of computing an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair that
approximately satisfy (16) can be written as an ǫ-ETR problem with p TMV polynomial constraints
of degree 2 and length 2 and two vector variables. Hence, we can use Theorem 2 with γ = ‖Y‖∞
which is constant, α = c, n = 2, t = 2, d = 2, and m = p to find a solution if exists, or decide that
no such solution exists. ⊓⊔
I Computational Geometry Applications
I.1 Segment intersection graphs
Definitions. Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We say that G is a
segment graph if there are straight segments s1, s2, . . . , sn in the plane such that, for every i, j, 1 ≤
i < j ≤ n, the segments si and sj have a common point if and only if {vi, vj} ∈ E(G).
By a suitable rotation of the co-ordinate system we can achieve that none of the segments is
vertical. Then the segment si representing vertex vi can be algebraically described as the set {(x, y) ∈
R
2 : y = aix + bi, ci ≤ x ≤ di} for some real numbers ai, bi, ci, di. We say that G is a simplex K
segment graph if the real numbers ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, 2, . . . n are under the constraints
ai, bi, ci, di ≥ 0, for every i = 1, 2, . . . n, and
n∑
i=1
(ai + bi + ci + di) = K, where K > 0 is a given constant.
We let SIM-K-SEG denote the class of all simplex K segment graphs with parameter K > 0.
The problem ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-SEG) is defined as follows. Given an abstract undirected graph
G, does it belong with tolerance ǫ to SIM-K-SEG?
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Formulation of ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-SEG). We first give a description for the problem with ǫ = 0
and then we generalize for arbitrary ǫ ≥ 0. The formulation is taken from [29].
Letting li be the line containing si, we note that si ∩ sj 6= ∅ if li and lj intersect in a single
point whose x-coordinate lies in both the intervals [ci, di] and [cj , dj ]. As is easy to calculate, that
x-coordinate equals
bj−bi
ai−aj
.
Now we turn to the general case where ǫ ≥ 0. Let us introduce variables Ai, Bi, Ci, Di representing
the unknown quantities ai, bi, ci, di, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By the problem’s definition we require the vector
(A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn) to be in the (4n−1)-simplex with parameterK. Then si∩sj 6= ∅
can be expressed by the following predicate:
INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di,Aj , Bj , Cj , Dj) =
(Ai >ǫ Aj ∧ Ci(Ai −Aj) ≤ǫ Bj −Bi ≤ǫ Di(Ai −Aj)
∧Cj(Ai −Aj) ≤ǫ Bj −Bi ≤ǫ Dj(Ai −Aj))
∨(Ai <ǫ Aj ∧ Ci(Ai −Aj) ≥ǫ Bj −Bi ≥ǫ Di(Ai −Aj)
∧Cj(Ai −Aj) ≥ǫ Bj −Bi ≥ǫ Dj(Ai −Aj))
(this is only correct if we “globally” assume that Ci ≤ǫ Di for all i). The existence of a SEG-
representation of G can then be expressed by the formula
(∃A1B1C1D1 . . . AnBnCnDnK)
(
n∧
i=1
Ci ≤ǫ Di
)
∧

 ∧
{i,j}∈E
INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Aj , Bj, Cj , Dj)


∧

 ∧
{i,j}/∈E
¬INTS(Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Aj , Bj , Cj , Dj)


Theorem 9. There is an algorithm that runs in time nO(K
2·logn/ǫ2) and either finds a vector (A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn)
that is a solution to ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-SEG), or determines that there is no solution to 0-RECOG(SIM-
K-SEG).
Proof. We set x = (A1, B1, C1, D1, . . . , An, Bn, Cn, Dn) and F (x) to be the above formula that we
constructed. Their combination makes an ǫ-ETR instance. Vector x is constrained over the convex
set defined by the vertices of the (4n− 1)-simplex, i.e. vectors vi ∈ R4n, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .4n} with their
i-th element equal to K and the rest equal to 0. Therefore the cardinality of our convex set is m = 4n,
and γ = K. By looking at the formula we can conclude that a = 1, t = 4, and d = 2. By Theorem 3
the result follows. ⊓⊔
I.2 Unit disk intersection graphs
Definitions. Let G be an undirected graph with vertex set {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We say that G is a unit
disk intersection graph or unit disk graph if there are disks d1, d2, . . . , dn (in the plane) with radius
1 such that, for every i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, the disks di and dj have more than one points common (i.e.
an area) if and only if {vi, vj} ∈ E(G).
The disk di representing vertex vi can be algebraically described as the set {(x, y) ∈ R2 : (x −
xi)
2 + (y− yi)2 ≤ 1} for some real numbers xi, yi that determine the centre of the disk. We say that
G is a simplex K unit disk graph if the real numbers xi, yi, i = 1, 2, . . . n are under the constraints
xi, yi ≥ 0, for every i = 1, 2, . . . n, and
n∑
i=1
(xi + yi) = K, where K > 0 is a given constant.
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We let SIM-K-UDG denote the class of all simplex K unit disk graphs with parameter K > 0.
The problem ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-UDG) is defined as follows. Given an abstract undirected graph
G, does it belong with tolerance ǫ to SIM-K-UDG?
Formulation of ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-UDG). Let us introduce variablesXi, Yi representing the unknown
quantities xi, yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We require the vector (X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) to be in the (2n − 1)-
simplex with parameter K. Then we consider an ǫ-intersection di ∩ǫ dj 6= ∅ to happen if:√
(Xi −Xj)2 + (Yi − Yj)2 < 2 + ǫ
and an ǫ-non-intersection di ∩ǫ dj = ∅ to happen if:√
(Xi −Xj)2 + (Yi − Yj)2 ≥ 2− ǫ
The existence of a UDG-representation of G can then be expressed by the formula
(∃X1Y1 . . .XnYn)
 ∧
{i,j}∈E
(Xi −Xj) · (Xi −Xj) + (Yi − Yj) · (Yi − Yj) < 4 + 2ǫ+ ǫ2


∧

 ∧
{i,j}/∈E
(Xi −Xj) · (Xi −Xj) + (Yi − Yj) · (Yi − Yj) ≥ 4− 2ǫ+ ǫ2


Theorem 10. There is an algorithm that runs in time nO(K
2·logn/ǫ2) and either finds a vector
(X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) that is a solution to ǫ-RECOG(SIM-K-UDG), or determines that there is no
solution to 0-RECOG(SIM-K-UDG).
Proof. We set x = (X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) and F (x) to be the above formula that we constructed. Their
combination makes an ǫ-ETR instance. Vector x is constrained over the convex set defined by the
vertices of the (2n− 1)-simplex, i.e. vectors vi ∈ R2n, i ∈ {1, 2, . . .2n} with their i-th element equal
to K and the rest equal to 0. Therefore the cardinality of our convex set is m = 2n, and γ = K.
By looking at the formula we can conclude that a = 2, t = 7, and d = 2. By Theorem 3 the result
follows. ⊓⊔
